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ANALYSIS & COMMENTARY
Beyond Capitation: How New
Payment Experiments Seek To
Find The ‘Sweet Spot’ In Amount
Of Risk Providers And Payers Bear
ABSTRACT A key issue in the decades-long struggle over US health care
spending is how to distribute liability for expenses across all market
participants, from insurers to providers. The rise and abandonment in
the 1990s of capitation payments—lump-sum, per person payments to
health care providers to provide all care for a specified individual or
group—offers a stark example of how difficult it is for providers to
assume meaningful financial responsibility for patient care. This article
chronicles the expansion and decline of the capitation model in the
1990s. We offer lessons learned and assess the extent to which these
lessons have been applied in the development of contemporary forms of
provider cost sharing, particularly accountable care organizations, which
in effect constitute a search for the “sweet spot,” or appropriate place on
a spectrum, between providers and payers with respect to the degree of
risk they absorb.
T
he story of capitation payment
models is central to understanding
the struggle over controlling US
health care spending.We relate that
story here, beginning with the cap-
itation experience in the 1990s, when its popu-
larity peaked and then declined.
We recount the lessons learned and explain
how they have been or could be applied to
modern paymentmodels, with a particular focus
on the accountable care organization. We con-
clude that the vision of the accountable care
organization model reflects some of the lessons
learned fromcapitation during the 1990s.Never-
theless, limitations remain that leave in question
whether these organizations will succeed where
capitation failed as a successful cost-con-
trol model.
Originating in California and spreading across
the country, capitation emerged in the mid-to-
late 1990s as an instrument used by managed
care organizations to control skyrocketing
health care spending. Under capitation, the
managed care organization paid providers a
fixed annual or monthly lump sum per patient.
If a provider organization could deliver health
care services to a specified patient or group of
patients that cost less than the lumpsum, itmade
a profit; otherwise, it lost money.1 The idea was
that capitation would offer incentives to provide
“the right care, at the right time, in the right
place, with the right use of resources.”2
Relative to other managed care cost-control
tools (for example, preauthorization require-
ments and utilization review), capitation did
have advantages for payers, such as greater cer-
tainty when setting budgets, and for providers,
such as more control over the provision of care.
But it also had limitations, such as greater finan-
cial risk for providers who could not offer care
for less than the lump sum, and incentives to
stint on care.3
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Capitation & Shared Savings
The story of capitation exists within a decades-
long struggle amongUShealth care stakeholders
to control spending. That struggle continues to-
day, motivating experimentation with different
payment models. Among these experiments, a
key distinction is the degree to which they at-
tempt to control or influence the volume and
intensity of services provided, as opposed to
merely controlling prices. “It’s the Prices, Stu-
pid,” is the title of anow-famousarticlebyGerard
Anderson and colleagues establishing that US
health care spending is above that of other na-
tions in large part because of higher prices.4
It is also true, however, that prices—at least
those of public programs—have been somewhat
stable, growing at a modest rate over the past
several decades. Price control has been estab-
lished in Medicare, for example, because of re-
forms that replacedpurely cost-based reimburse-
ment with prospective payments and bundling.
Those reforms have contributed to a gradual
slowing in Medicare spending growth.5 Yet
health care spending growth is still above that
of the wider economy, as measured by the gross
domestic product. Although health care prices
are a significant growth factor in the commercial
insurance market, the main culprit for public
and private payers alike is likely to be health care
service volume.
Policy makers have again turned their atten-
tion toward new methods to control volume, in-
cluding exhibiting renewed interest in shifting
cost risk to providers, as capitation did in the
1990s.Yet the capitated arrangements of that era
proved unsustainable. Is history doomed to re-
peat itself? Not necessarily, as we explain.
Managed Care In The 1990s
As costs of job-based traditional indemnity
health insurance contracts, also known as tradi-
tional fee-for-service or conventional insurance,
increased in the late 1980s and early 1990s, em-
ployers sought less costly alternatives. Managed
care groups, such as health maintenance organ-
izations, preferred provider organizations, and
point-of-service plans, emerged to offer employ-
ers cheaper options in exchange for restricting
employees’ access to providers within the man-
aged care network.
In contrast to traditional indemnity contracts,
which paid most providers on a fee-for-service
basis, managed care paid providers contracted
within their networks discounted fees subject to
utilization review—largely in the form of pre-
authorization for services and networks of pre-
ferred providers. The fees also provided some
financial incentives, or bonuses, for providers
to keep costs down.6 This form of selective con-
tracting and reimbursement discounts signaled
a temporary shift in the balance of power from
providers to managed care organizations.7
Initially, managed care groups found it rela-
tively easy to keep cost growth low. They nego-
tiated lower prices fromproviderswhowerewor-
ried about losing patient volume if they were not
included in managed care networks. As a result,
health care spending grew more slowly in the
first half of the 1990s than it had in the prior
decade.8
After a few years, however, the ability of man-
aged care groups to continue paying providers at
discounted rates waned. By 1997 fewer than half
of all managed care organizations were profit-
able, largely because of a return to more rapid
growth in medical expenditures.9 As managed
care groups attempted to leverage their control
over providers throughmore onerous utilization
restrictions and additional demands of price re-
ductions, conflict arose, sparking a provider
backlash in the late 1990s. Providers consoli-
dated to gain market leverage and negotiate
more favorable contract terms with managed
care organizations.10 Over time, the managed
care utilization reviews and restrictions became
unpopular with the general public as well.11
Nevertheless, capitation increased in popular-
ity and became more widely adopted during this
timeperiod.Theattractionwas inpart becauseof
managed care plans’ efforts to limit their finan-
cial exposure through capitation and in part be-
cause of many providers’ desire to regain more
professional autonomyby escaping the demands
of other managed care cost-control tools (for
example, preauthorization and utilization re-
view). By 1999 approximately one-third of physi-
cians had capitation contracts. Among those
who did, revenues from these contracts ac-
counted for 21 percent of their total revenues.12
Capitation Temporarily Shifts Risk
To Providers
Physician Practice Management Companies
Growth in physicians’ acceptance of the capita-
tionmodel coincidedwith the rapid expansionof
physician practice management companies—
corporate entities designed to operate physician
practices efficiently. As for-profit, investor-
owned companies, these firms purchased physi-
cian practices and linked them together in large
networks to gain economies of scale and scope as
well as to enhance bargaining power against
managed care organizations.13 The three largest
companies—Phycor, MedPartners, and FPA
Medical Management—went public in the mid-
1990s and saw their stock prices and revenue
skyrocket in their early years.14
Capitation & Shared Savings
1952 Health Affairs September 2012 31 :9
At this point, the fate of capitation became
partially connected to the fate of these physician
practice management companies. Both raised
the following question: Howmuch financial risk
could providers handle?15
Similar to managed care, physician practice
management companies initially performedwell
financially. They infused many physician practi-
ces with badly needed investment capital and
revenue at a time when physicians’ average net
income was dropping.16 Yet as was true of man-
aged care organizations, their earnings were
short-lived, as stock prices increased initially be-
cause of the belief that market growth would
later translate into more efficient care—and
not because of improved management.
By 1998 Phycor and FPAMedicalManagement
declared bankruptcy,whileMedPartners sold off
its physician groups to become a pharmacy ben-
efit manager only.Wall Street’s valuation of the
fifteen largest physician practice management
companies fell by more than 60 percent between
December 1997 and September 1998, and the
entire industry lost nearlyhalf of its stockmarket
value over the same period.13,14
At the same time, many provider groups suf-
fered massive financial losses from their capita-
tion contracts in part because of a downward
pressure from payers on payment rates that oc-
curred while medical spending growth reaccel-
erated.17
Acquisitions And Mergers Seeking a com-
petitive edge, physician practices grew through
acquisitions and mergers. The larger the pro-
vider group, the more leverage it would have
to secure better terms in contract negotiations
with managed care organizations. Thus, as pro-
viders regained the upper hand in their annual
negotiationswith insurers in the late 1990s, they
canceled their capitation contracts. A less posi-
tive consequence of larger provider organiza-
tions, though, was that many became saddled
with conflicting physician and administrative
cultures, resulting in diseconomies of scale
and unmanageable entities.13
Lessons Learned From The 1990s
We can draw several lessons from the experience
with capitation in the 1990s that may inform
current cost-control efforts. First, in shifting
the liability for health costs from insurers to
providers, capitation forced providers to learn
to manage financial risk. Relatively smaller
health care organizations were unable to spread
such risk over sufficient numbers of patients,
which threatened their viability and the quality
of care they provided.18 Providers, therefore,
were encouraged to consolidate to spread risk
over a greater number of patients. Yet even by
consolidating, not all providers succeeded in
controlling the risk or managing their larger
organizations.
Assumption of risk management by providers
puts them in a different business than one solely
of provision of care. Good care for a particular
patient may demand greater use of resources
than a provider can bear financially. This may
motivate providers under capitation to refer pa-
tients to practices outside their organization
(thereby shifting the risk to another organiza-
tion), while retaining the capitated payment.
Although this may be financially advantageous
for providers, it fragments care and may have
adverse consequences for patients’ health and
satisfaction.19
The consolidation that capitation encourages
increases provider market power. As their nego-
tiating leverage relative to that of insurers in-
creases, providers can demand and obtain better
contracting terms, including higher payments
and even a departure from capitation itself.
Coupled with the financial risks of being too
small, the negotiating power of consolidation
suggests there is a “sweet spot” for capitation
somewhere in between for both providers and
insurers. A small provider bears toomuch finan-
cial risk under capitation; a large provider shifts
too much negotiation risk to insurers. It is un-
clear whether policy makers or scholars know
how to manage health systems into that sweet
spot or even know what size it is.
The 1990s experience suggests several short-
comings of early capitation models. Below we
discusswhethernewerpaymentmodelsmay suc-
cessfully avoid them.
Today’s Incentives For Efficiency
There is renewed interest today in shifting the
risk of health care costs from payers to providers
once more, particularly under health reform.
With the latest efforts, policy makers and stake-
holders seem tohave learned someof the lessons
from the 1990s experiencewith capitation. Aswe
discuss, new provider payment models share
some similarities with the capitated arrange-
ments of that era, but they also feature important
differences. It thus is not clear whether or not
they will suffer the same fate.
Payment systems vary in the degree to which
providers and payers bear the risk and respon-
sibility for financinghealthcarecosts (Exhibit 1).
For instance, in a fee-for-service model, payers
bear more financial risk than providers. Under
capitation, providers bearmore risk thanpayers.
Today, themajority of physicians are paid on a
fee-for-service basis, while most hospital pay-
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ments are tied to diagnosis-related groups
(DRGs), a formofbundledpayment for inpatient
services based on diagnoses. Unlike cost-based
reimbursement, which establishes no prospec-
tive control over prices or volume, fee-for-service
and DRG-based payment offer certainty of
prices, which are set or negotiated prospectively.
However, the level of utilization is typically not
underpayers’ control. Consequently, for all prac-
tical purposes, most of the financial risk in the
US health care system still rests on the payer
side.Whatever level of services providers deliver,
payers must reimburse.
The Affordable Care Act includes a number of
initiatives designed tomoveMedicare away from
fee-for-service or DRG-based payment models.
One of them is the National Pilot Program on
Payment Bundling, which will combine pay-
ments for services delivered across an episode
of care, such as heart bypass or hip replacement,
instead of paying for services separately.20 As
shown in Exhibit 1, episode-based bundled pay-
ments are one step shy of capitation. They shift
the risk of costs under each episode toward pro-
viders that bundle all hospital, physician, and
other clinical services into a single rate21 but
put the payer at risk for the number of episodes.
The Affordable Care Act also supports the cre-
ation of accountable care organizations. An
accountable care organization is a network of
providers responsible for the care of a defined
group of patients and, in part, the cost and qual-
ity of that care. Modeled somewhat on private-
sector examples of fully or partly integrated
health delivery systems such as Kaiser Perma-
nente andGeisingerHealth System, accountable
care organizations have the goal of providing
financial incentives for coordinated, judicious
useof appropriate, high-quality care.22 Examples
are discussed below.
Medicare’s Shared Savings ProgramUnder
Medicare’s Shared Savings Program, contracted
providers are paid standard Medicare rates and
receive bonus payments if quality targets aremet
and if total spending for patients affiliated with
the accountable care organization falls below a
certain benchmark. This benchmark consists of
a projected spending amount based on the pro-
vider’s pastMedicare costs. The lower the spend-
ing relative to the benchmark, the larger the
organization’s bonus payment, although some
of the savings are retained by, or “shared” with,
Medicare.
Qualification for and levels of bonuses depend
on performance relative to thirty-three quality
measures pertaining to patient experience and
safety; preventive health services; and at-risk
populations, including those with diabetes, hy-
pertension, ischemic vascular disease, heart fail-
ure, and coronary artery disease. Tying bonuses
to quality metrics is intended to strike a balance
between appropriate efficiency and inappropri-
ate stinting or rationing.23
There are two possible types of accountable
care organization contracts under the Medicare
Shared Savings Program. One has only an up-
side: Accountable care organizations can obtain
bonuses if their spending is below their bench-
mark. Another has an upside and a downside:
Accountable care organizations entering into
such two-sided shared savings and risk contracts
can obtain slightly larger bonuses as well as pay
a penalty if their spending is above the
benchmark.24
As of August 2012 the Centers for Medicare
and Medicaid Services had entered into Shared
Savings Program contracts with 116 organiza-
tions serving 2.4 million beneficiaries in forty
states.25,26 Among them are nine independent
practice associations that are affiliated with Col-
laborative Health Systems, a subsidiary of
Universal American Corporation, which offers
insurance products, including Medicare Advan-
tage plans.25 This fact illustrates that it is not just
hospitals that can become accountable care or-
ganizations, but any organizations that contract
with independent physicians.
Medicare’s Pioneer Accountable Care Or-
ganizations In December 2011 the Department
of Health and Human Services (HHS) also an-
nounced the selection of thirty-two health care
Exhibit 1
Financial Risk Of Care For Provider And Payer, By Payment Method
Fi
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Cost FFS Per diem Per episode
(bundled payment)
Capitation
Payer cost risk
Provider cost risk
Payment method
SOURCE Authors’ adaptation of a similar figure in Averill RF, Goldfield NI, Vertrees JC, McCullough EC,
Fuller RL, Eisenhandler J. Achieving cost control, care coordination, and quality improvement through
incremental payment system reform. J Ambul Care Manage. 2010;33(1):2–23. NOTES The figure is
focused on ways of paying providers for the care of a single patient. Omitted, for example, are paying
physicians by salary (as in the Department of Veterans Affairs) and providing an institution with a
budget that encompasses many or all patients. FFS is fee-for-service.
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provider organizations to participate as Pioneer
Accountable Care Organizations.27 These organ-
izations already had experiencemanaging finan-
cial risk and had systems in place for delivering
quality-monitored care.
Pioneer Accountable Care Organizations are
eligible to receive bonuses or incur penalties if
their payments are below or above, respectively,
an established benchmark based on their spend-
ing histories. In addition, in the third year of the
program, these organizations can enter into par-
tial capitation arrangements with Medicare,
under which a portion of their payments will
take the formof a capitated, fixedpayment,while
the rest remain as fee-for-service payments
(Hoangmai Pham, Center for Medicare and
Medicaid Innovation, personal communication,
June 18, 2012).28
Private-Sector Initiatives Contracts simi-
lar to accountable care organizations also exist
in the private sector. At least eight private insur-
ers have contracted with providers under a two-
sided shared savings and risk model, including
Aetna; Anthem/WellPoint; and Blue Cross Blue
Shield plans in Illinois, Massachusetts, New Jer-
sey, and North Carolina. And at least twenty-
seven private-sector insurers have entered into
shared savings contracts with providers, making
themeligible forbonuspaymentsbutnot placing
them at risk for penalties. Other plans have con-
tracted with providers on a partial capitation
basis, featuring a combination of a preset budget
with fee-for-service payments.
Then Versus Now: Challenges Ahead
For Accountable Care Organizations
Differences Accountable care organizations
andmanaged care organizations employing cap-
itation share one goal: to increase efficiency of
health care delivery by shifting risk to providers.
However, the accountable care organization
model diverges frommanagedcareand capitated
payments in several respects.
First, managed care organizations are insur-
ers, not providers. Although some accountable
care organizations may assume insurance risk,
or be liable for losses if their costs exceed pay-
ment, they are first and foremost provider organ-
izations. Second, unlike in managed care organ-
izations, to receive coverage for care, Medicare
patients are not required to see providers within
an accountable care organization, and they are
not penalized if they seek care elsewhere. For
payment and quality monitoring purposes,
Medicare patients are assigned to accountable
care organizations based onwhere they typically
receive primary care. However, they may seek
care from any health care provider.29 Some pri-
vate-sector accountable care organization–like
contracts do provide incentives to patients to
receive in-network care, but they do not bar pa-
tients from seeking care elsewhere.
Third, none of the accountable care organiza-
tion arrangements feature full capitation. In-
stead, they are a mix of fee-for-service payments
with shared savings; shared savings and shared
risk; or partial capitation, which is a combina-
tion of a preset budget with fee-for-service pay-
ments. As such, they are an intermediate step
toward cost control, one that includes greater
incentives for providers to control the use of
services but places them at less risk than full
capitation does.
Finally, accountable care organizations are
paid, in part, based on achieving quality targets.
This was rarely, if ever, a part of the 1990s cap-
itation contracts.
Have The Lessons Of The 1990s Been Ap-
plied? Some of the lessons of the 1990s experi-
ence with capitation seem to have informed the
new accountable care organization payment
models. First, the movement away from full cap-
itation is an important one. Accountable care
organizations do not put providers at the same
high degree of risk for health care spending that
capitated arrangements do. If accountable care
organizations fail to meet utilization bench-
marks, the financial penalties are more modest
than under full capitation, and in some cases
there are none. In addition, Medicare rules dic-
tate that accountable care organizations must
serve at least 5,000 beneficiaries, thereby
spreading risk over a relatively large patient
base.28,30
Nevertheless, accountable care organizations
that are better able to assume risk for health
spending may be better positioned in the long
term.31 Fee-for-service Medicare payments to
hospitals and physicians are scheduled to de-
cline considerably in the coming years.32 Conse-
quently, the bonus payments available via
accountable care organization payment models
may become a relatively more important source
of provider revenue.
Organizations that canmanage costs aswell as
care across a continuum of settings are more
likely to succeed as accountable care organiza-
tions. Some observers argue that the required
operational infrastructure is more likely to be
found among health plans, as opposed to pro-
vider groups.33 This prospect suggests that or-
ganizations with an insurance operation, such
as Geisinger Health System or Kaiser Perma-
nente, may be better able to serve and survive
as accountable care organizations. An unan-
swered question is how the ideal accountable
care organization can be successfully replicated.
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Another lesson from the 1990s pertains to how
decisions will be made to assign the cost of care
for patients when it is delivered outside the con-
tracted organization. Under all of the Medicare
accountable care organization models, the cost
of care is attributed to the accountable care
organization to which a patient is assigned, re-
gardless of who treats the patient. Under capita-
tion, that cost was borne by whoever provided
the care. Assigning costs to the accountable care
organization even when the organization does
not provide the care reduces the perverse incen-
tive under managed care to refer patients to
other organizations for high-cost services.
However, patients may voluntarily choose to
receive high-cost services elsewhere for a variety
of reasons. Should accountable care organiza-
tion be fully liable for the cost of care in these
instances? Accountable care organizations in
competition with each other could attempt a
strategic gameof providing highmargin services
to each other’s assigned patients, collecting pay-
ment while having the cost assigned to their
rivals, as some analysts have suggested.34
Challenges Ahead An inevitable question in
today’s health reform environment is whether,
given the challenges associated with capitation-
based models in the past, the accountable care
organization model can succeed. Perhaps the
best evidence we have to date are the results of
the 2005–10 Medicare Physician Group Practice
demonstration.
Under the demonstration project, ten partici-
pating medical groups, covering 220,000 bene-
ficiaries, were eligible for shared savings contin-
gent on performance on ten to thirty-two quality
measures. The results were mixed. Quality im-
proved, but Medicare saved only about $121 per
beneficiary over the span of the demonstration.
However, the modest savings may reflect insuf-
ficient incentives for efficiency, rather than a
failure of the shared savings concept in general.
Moreover, the five-year time span of the dem-
onstrationmay have been too brief for groups to
adjust patterns of care substantially from prior
norms.35 Nevertheless, the experience of the
Physician Group Practice demonstration raises
questions as to whether the accountable care
organization model will generate sufficient sav-
ings, either.
Health policy experts have raised additional
concerns about the viability of the accountable
care organizationmodel. For one, concerns have
been raised that accountable care organizations
provide incentives for coordination andprovider
integration that can encourage the amassing of
market power among providers, as occurred
among physicians in response to managed care
organizations in the 1990s. As hospitals consoli-
date into systems or merge with physician prac-
tices to better provide a continuum of coordi-
nated care, they also gain greater negotiating
power over payers.
Although Medicare is largely immune to pro-
vider market power, private insurers are not.
One potential consequence of Medicare’s push
toward accountable care organizations is that
hospitals and other provider groups in some
markets will increase their bargaining leverage
over insurers, extracting higher prices in con-
tract negotiations and leading to higher private
insurance premiums.36
Conclusion
The allure of shifting financial risk from payers
to providers under capitation is understandable:
the nation faces rising health care spending
driven largely by growing volume and intensity
of care, including potentially wasteful and inap-
propriate use. But such a shift may encourage
stinting, promote growth of provider market
power, or threaten the viability of providers that
are not capable of managing the risk. The expe-
rience of the 1990s demonstrates that these are
not just theoretical concerns.
However, newer models of provider payment
reform offer an intermediate point between full
insurer and full payer financial risk. None of the
new payment models being introduced or com-
ing online in the next several years would fully
capitate payments to providers.Yet they still pro-
vide incentives forproviders todeliver less-costly
and higher-quality care.
Together with other health reforms and initia-
tives, such as increased comparative effective-
ness research and Medicare savings pursued
by the Independent Payment Advisory Board,
accountable care organizations offer an oppor-
tunity to increase quality and reduce spending
while potentially avoiding some of the larger
dangers that doomed capitation.37 Nevertheless,
they are not without their own limitations and
challenges, as we have noted.
Examples of successful, efficient provider or-
ganizations already exist today—including Vir-
giniaMasonandGroupHealthof PugetSound in
Seattle, Carilion Health System in Virginia, and
Scott and White Healthcare in central Texas.
However, these organizations have not all fully
integrated the delivery and payment functions of
an accountable care organization.28,30 Replicat-
ing efficient models that do integrate delivery
and payment is a challenge, in that an efficient
delivery system usually entails a reduction in
spending, which translates into the loss of in-
come for providers.38
We believe that the newpaymentmodels being
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pursued under health reform have sufficiently
evolved from the failed capitated arrangements
of the 1990s to make them a worthy experiment.
However, some observers are skeptical that
newer models can save a sizable amount of
money, arguing that only full capitation or sim-
ilar models will do so.39,40 Yet as we explained,
policy makers and stakeholders are justifiably
wary of repeating the failed capitation experi-
ment. It is not yet evident how to resolve this
Catch-22. Full capitation did not succeed, but
models that fall short of it might not, either.
The United States remains in the same situa-
tion it has been in for decades: unsure of how to
bend the cost curve while maintaining or im-
proving thequality of care.With accountable care
organizations, the search for the sweet spot be-
tween provider and payer risk continues. ▪
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